India’s Nepal Policy Needs Caution, Not Grandstanding

India’s Nepal Policy Needs Caution, Not Grandstanding

BY S.D. MUNI ON 23/09/2015

India has reacted strongly to Nepal’s new constitution. In India’s official statements issued on the subject, the promulgation of the new Constitution has just been “noted”, not welcomed. Concern has been expressed over the disturbed situation in the Terai region that borders India. Nepal has been urged to resolve differences “through dialogue in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation” so as to “enable broad-based ownership and acceptance”. India’s ambassador in Kathmandu spoke to Nepal’s Prime Minister about the difficulties being faced by India’s “freight companies and transporters” in “movements within Nepal” due to prevailing unrest. This may, if allowed to persist, result in essential supplies from India to Nepal getting disrupted.

The statements and the underlying warning on the issue of supplies have brought a sudden low in the bilateral relationship which had received a boost after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to Nepal in 2014.

In some ways, the situation is reminiscent of 1989, when King Birendra’s decision to import anti-aircraft guns from China and refuse to reform the Panchayat system in the face of the democratic movement precipitated tensions in India-Nepal bilateral relations. At the same time, the India-Nepal trade treaty lapsed and the Rajiv Gandhi government closed down the special entry points for trade and transit – resulting in the severe shortage of essential supplies in Nepal.

India’s objections

India has its reasons to be upset with the way Nepali leaders have gone about the constitution-making process. Three of them are obvious and openly stated. First, the constitution as promulgated is not inclusive. It ignores the aspirations and sensitivities of the Madhesis, the janjatis (tribal groups), dalits and women. This is contrary to the spirit of the Jan Andolan-II that created a vision of New Nepal and against the assurances given by the late Girija Prasad Koirala as Prime Minister in 2007 during the Madhes agitation. Janjatis and women had also been repeatedly assured that their concerns would be accommodated. Then, the manner in which the promulgation was effected is clearly in conflict with the principle of consensus adopted in Nepal’s interim Constitution. The leaders of the major political parties belonging to the dominant hill social groups have ignored the wishes of the marginalised groups in the new constitution. The marginalised groups are accordingly agitating against the bulldozing of the constitutional process. The use of force by the government to suppress the agitation has resulted in the loss of more than 40 lives, with many more injured. Life has come to a standstill in nearly 20 of the 22 Terai districts of Nepal. There are also agitations in Kathmandu which have been joined by monarchists, Hindutva forces and extremist Maoist splinter groups.

The second reason for India’s reaction is that the violence in the Terai region can spill over into the bordering Indian areas. Particulalrly sensitive in this respect is Bihar, which is in the midst of a crucial electoral process. The ruling BJP has very high stakes in the Bihar elections and fears that violence and instability in the Nepal Terai will help its opponents led by Nitish Kumar, Lalu Prasad and the Congress party. It is feared in New Delhi that if the conflict between the Kathmandu authorities and the marginalised groups, particularly the Terai people, is not resolved amicably soon, the persisting turbulence will continue to adversely affect India’s bordering region.

The third and most important factor behind New Delhi’s displeasure arises from the Modi government’s feeling of being ignored in the constitutional process. India had been encouraging Nepali leaders to draft an inclusive and democratic constitution. In his address to the Constituent Assembly in August 2014, Modi had hoped that Nepal’s new constitution would be like a bouquet of flowers representing the different shades of Nepal’s communities, regions and opinions – and reflecting a broad national consensus. His address had been universally acclaimed in Nepal. He underlined the same theme during his second visit to Kathmadu during the SAARC summit in November last year. He has also done his best to lift Indo-Nepal relations by trying to fulfil pending Indian promises and committing India’s support and help in Nepal’s development. During the earthquake in Nepal, India went out of its way in extending all possible support. The Nepali leaders, have, however, been unresponsive to Indian concerns regarding the constitutional process.

Modi ignored

Some prominent Nepali leaders like Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, Madhav Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist Leninist (UML) and Prachanda of the United Communist Party of Nepal – Maoists, were invited for consultations to New Delhi to make them appreciate India’s concerns. All of them endorsed these concerns and assured India that marginalised groups would be accommodated. But there were no signs of this being done as the process started moving towards conclusion.

Barely a week before the promulgation of the constitution, External Affairs minister Sushma Swaraj in a statement on September 14, 2015, recalled “the encouraging voices… from Nepalese leaders” that “the Constitution will carry along all regions and sections”. She expressed India’s concern “over the ongoing protests and strife in several parts of Nepal” and urged “continuing flexibility on the part of all the political forces so that all outstanding issues are addressed through dialogue and widest possible agreement, in an atmosphere free from violence”.

Not only did this not make any difference to the situation in Nepal and the direction of the constitution making process, but instead India was blamed for inciting violence in the Terai and interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala’s press adviser wrote an article in a Nepali newspaper asking India to desist from such interference.

Finally, the Nepal Constituent Assembly adopted the constitution on September 17, by voting for its remaining clauses but without any accommodation towards the demands of the marginalised groups and India’s appeals. This led Prime Minister Modi to send a special envoy, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to see if any last minute effort could be made to redress the situation, but in vain. Therefore, the Indian establishment has felt frustrated and dismayed.

Where India went wrong

The Modi government’s frustration with Nepal’s constitutional process seems to have been fuelled further by two other factors that have not been publicly and officially expressed.

One is that sections of the ruling party, particularly the Hindutva forces were keen to make Nepal a Hindu state and possibly create space for the future reinstatement of the monarchy. Considerable effort and material support had been extended to Nepali monarchists and Hindutva forces to mobilise support and raise their voices in this regard by the concerned political sections of the ruling party. Nepal’s new constitution has only accommodated them to the extent of making the cow a national animal, discouraging cow slaughter and adding a definition of “secularism” that covers respect and protection of all religion, including Hinduism. Second, India feels that the Nepal’s major parties have been more accommodative in the constitutional process towards the lobbying efforts of China and the European Union on issues of religion and federalism than to India’s concerns.

Notwithstanding the attitude of the dominant social groups which have driven the process of Nepali constitution making, New Delhi ought to have bee cautious and cool in its reactions. It should have welcomed Nepal’s first Republican and democratic constitution worked out by popularly elected representatives. This was the promise made by India way back in 1951, when the anarchical Rana system was being transformed, initiating a process of democratisation. India should also realise that the fragmented Terai leadership was unable to throw its proportionate weight in the constitutional process. Many of the Madhesi, janajati and women members of the Constituent Assembly have also voted for the new constitution – though under the pressure of their political bosses.

The new constitution has sharply polarised Nepal along ethnic and regional lines. This polarisation will keep Nepal unstable and turbulent, which is not at all in India’s long term interests. To jump into such a polarisation by taking sides is neither a prudent policy or effective diplomacy. India’s effort should have been to nudge both sides of the polarised debate through quiet and sustained diplomacy so that an amicable resolution was found. Instead, India’s policy unfolded in three different stages within the broad parameters of Prime Minister Modi’s Constituent Assembly address in Nepal last year. These stages have moved from being (i) “hands off”, to (ii) “having a Constitution is better than no constitution at all” and finally (iii) insistence on specific issues.

India could not sensitise itself adequately to understand the internal dynamics of posturing and power-sharing within and between Nepali political parties, so as to move them in the desired direction. This failure has now landed India in the company of monarchists, Hindu fanatics and left extremists (break away radical Maoists) within the Nepali political spectrum. Some of these disruptionist forces are joining marginalised groups in burning copies of the new constitution and creating turmoil in Nepal. They are exploiting the situation to their advantage at the cost of India. There is need for India to approach the issues involved coolly and carefully so as to get justice for the marginalised groups – rather than reinforcing the already existing forces of anti-Indian pseudo-nationalism in Nepal.

S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, JNU. A Distinguished Fellow, IDSA he is a Former Special Envoy and Ambassador of India

http://thewire.in/2015/09/23/indias-nepal-policy-needs-caution-not-grandstanding-11430/

Making friends, influencing Nepal

Making friends, influencing Nepal

• Rakesh Sood

Reuters

A copy of Nepalese constitution lies on a table inside the Parliament in Kathmandu, Nepal.

The promulgation of Nepal’s Constitution has been followed by triumphalism on one side and agitation on the other. India’s present challenge is to recover lost political ground so that New Delhi can play the role of trusted interlocutor without resorting to micro-management.

Last Sunday, on September 20, Nepal promulgated its new Constitution. However, instead of being an occasion for celebration in which all Nepali citizens could participate, there is a tinge of triumphalism on one side and, on the other, a growing agitation masking a sentiment of betrayal. More than one-tenth of the Constituent Assembly (CA) members boycotted the final proceedings. And, as often happens when Nepal’s domestic politics is polarised and descends into a slugfest, Indian policies have become a convenient punching bag and Nepali nationalism reduces to anti-Indianism.

The current exercise kicked off in 2008 with the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA) with a two-year mandate to draft a new Constitution for a federal, democratic and republican Nepal. Even after the CA awarded itself four extensions, the task remained unfinished. The Supreme Court intervened to put an end to the repeated extensions in 2012 and, after a year, a new CA was elected in November 2013 for a four-year term though it gave itself a deadline of January 2015 to complete the Constitution which too was not observed.

The tragic earthquake in April, which claimed 9,000 lives and caused widespread damage estimated at $7 billion, became a wake-up call for the political leadership and the government, which had come in for all-round criticism for its inept crisis management. This galvanised the main political parties — the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPN(UML)] and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist [UCPN-Maoist) led by Prachanda — to push through a Constitution, by a two-thirds majority, if consensus was not possible. A 16-point agreement covering some of the major issues was announced in June.

Differences over federalism

At this point, the big three parties had the benefit of having Bijay Gachedar, leader of a Madhesi-Tharu party, on board as a signatory. This agreement foresaw the creation of eight provinces, with boundaries to be determined by an expert committee within six months. However, it was shot down by a Supreme Court single-judge bench on the grounds that the CA was responsible for defining the federal structure and this could not be delegated.

The big three then came out with a six-province proposal. Mr. Gachedar dissociated himself from it and as protests mounted, the three hurriedly made it a seven-province federal structure. Agitations turned increasingly violent in the Terai region and have claimed more than 40 casualties in the last month.

Though a small country, Nepal has more than a hundred ethnic groups. However, it has always been ruled by the Bahun-Chettri (Brahmin-Kshatriya) hill elite which, together with other hill upper castes, accounts for less than 30 per cent of the population. The leadership of the three major political parties, as well as that of the smaller pro-monarchy groups, belongs to this group. On the other hand, the Janajatis (hill tribes), Tharus (plains tribes), Dalits and Madhesis have traditionally been the oppressed groups.

Till 1950, a Madhesi needed a special permit to enter Kathmandu valley and citizenship was a major issue, which was finally addressed in the 1990s, with over three million citizenship certificates issued, though some concerns remained. These groups had periodically agitated for greater representation in power-sharing but always within the unitary framework of the monarchical system. When the decade-long Maoist insurgency ended in 2006, new demands grew for the abolition of monarchy and for a federal republic. NC and UML were always lukewarm to the idea and the federalism banner was largely carried forward by the Maoists (Janjatis were part of their cadres) and the Madhesis.

Madhesis have a kinship with their counterparts across the open border in India, particularly in northern Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP), often described as roti beti ka rishta (sharing food and matrimonial ties). During the Panchayat era, the 1963 administrative restructuring raised the number of districts from 32 to 75. In the bargain, Terai districts, which were earlier geographically restricted to the plains, now included areas north of the Siwalik Hills. Pahadi population in the Terai consequently went up from 6 per cent in 1952 to 36 per cent in 2001. Today, out of the 20 Terai districts bordering India, Madhesis enjoy a majority in less than half. Indian political leadership has been sensitive to their circumstances and has taken up their cause with the Kathmandu rulers. This has worked sometimes but has often also created tensions in the bilateral relationship which have demanded sensitive handling.

When the Constitution-drafting exercise began in 2008, the CA’s first decision was to abolish the 250-year-old monarchy while laying down principles for creating a democratic, secular, federal republic, often called a new Nepal. Over these years, Maoist and Madhesi forces have weakened. A section of the Maoist leadership was co-opted into the system and Prachanda is today rumoured to be a billionaire in dollar terms.

While the Maoists had emerged as the single-largest party in 2008 with 240 seats and the three Madhesi parties accounted for 84 seats, the outcome in 2013 elections turned out very differently. Maoists were down to 80 seats and the Madhesi parties which had splintered from three into a dozen, could only manage 40 seats. On the other hand, among the two old parties, NC moved up from 115 seats in 2008 to 196 and the UML from 108 to 175 seats, together accounting for nearly two-thirds of the CA (strength is 601) in 2013. Maoists lost ground because of rumours of corruption, poor governance and factionalism; Madhesis because of ego clashes, caste differences among Brahmins, Thakurs, Yadavs and Kurmis, and political fracturing which weakened the Madhes movement.

Differences over delineation of the provinces were narrowed down to five districts on the India-Nepal border — Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari in the east and Kanchanpur and Kailali in the west. Other contentious issues pertained to the delineation of electoral constituencies; inclusion in state structures on basis of ‘proportionality’; and the two categories of citizenship, by descent and by naturalisation — applicable to the foreign spouse of a Nepali national, a key Madhesi concern — and the debarring of the latter from certain government positions.

Some of these were not too difficult to settle but unfortunately, there was no serious effort to reach out and open a dialogue. None of the leaders of the big three parties and their Madhesi MPs took the initiative of going to the restive districts. Instead, all eyes were fixed on the sharing of spoils, for within the next few weeks, Nepal will get a new President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Speaker and Cabinet. Some deals have been struck, with K.P. Oli (UML) emerging as the likely next PM. Other contenders are in the fray for different positions but this jockeying too is limited to those belonging to the Bahun-Chettri elite.

India’s failed moves

To be fair, Indian policy on this issue has been consistent. In November 2014, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Kathmandu for the SAARC summit, it was clear that positions were hardening. PM Modi had said in a media interaction that outstanding differences should be resolved through dialogue and widespread consultation so that it could create the basis of a united, peaceful, stable and prosperous Nepal. A section of the Nepali media had reacted adversely terming it ‘unwarranted advice’. This was a sign of the changing winds and certainly, after Bijay Gachedar backed away from the 16-point agreement in June, the writing was clear on the wall.

Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s visit to Kathmandu last week, after the CA had completed formal voting on the Constitution, was too late and could hardly have been expected to yield a favourable outcome. Instead, it has been a spur to Nepali nationalism which, more often than not, carries strains of anti-Indianism. Official Indian statements ‘noting’ the promulgation of the new Constitution and expressing ‘deep concern’ over the incidents of violence are unlikely to fall on receptive ears and are at variance with the ‘welcoming’ statements from other major capitals. Kathmandu is abuzz with rumours that India is miffed and might resort to strong-arm tactics as in 1989-90, fuelling further anti-Indian sentiment.

Any policy, however consistent and well-crafted, yields results only if implemented properly. The time to use Indian influence by working with our friends was during the first half of the year. What was needed was to sensitise the leaders of the ‘big three’ parties to the risks of brinkmanship and get the agitating groups to unify so that a coherent stand could emerge. Instead, we played host to an assortment of Nepali leaders who would tell us what we wanted to hear, while going back to Kathmandu and doing precisely what they wanted to do.

For too long, this has been the tricky part of India-Nepal relations. With too many interlocutors, India’s message often loses clarity and impact. While the long-term objective should be to address the changing political narrative in Nepal, our present challenge is to recover lost political ground so that we can play the role of the trusted and irreplaceable interlocutor between the two sides, but without resorting to micro-management. Since 1950, Nepal has experimented with various Constitutions. It has had two interim Constitutions (1951 and 2007) and three formal Constitutions (1959, 1962 and 1990). Many thoughtful Nepalis realise that the 2015 Constitution is not perfect but if it has to stand the test of time, all sides have to climb down from their stated positions. However, the first move has to come from the leadership of the three major parties, the NC, the CPN (UML) and UCPN (Maoist).

(Rakesh Sood, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation till May 2014, is a former Ambassador to Nepal. E-mail: rakeshsood2001@yahoo.com.)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/rakesh-sood-writes-making-friends-influencing-nepal/article7689720.ece?

Federalism: Nepal’s final frontier

Federalism: Nepal’s final frontier

• Jayant Prasad

Nepal’s transition to a pluralist democracy faces a final challenge — failure of the three major parties to accommodate the legitimate demands of Janajati and Madhesi groups for true federalism.Greater consensus and not the imposition of an artificial deadline can help overcome it.

The long-awaited promulgation of a new Constitution within the next few days in Nepal was expected to be the culmination of its transition to a pluralist democracy. The institutionalisation of the gains of Nepal’s remarkable peace process should have been a time for celebration, heralding an era of harmony and progress. The Constitution is meant to reaffirm both the social purpose and the political commitments embedded in the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2007 interim Constitution, establishing Nepal as a federal democratic republic.

Instead, a revolt is gathering momentum across Nepal. The Terai has been on fire. Protests have shut it down for over the past three weeks. Forty persons and policemen have been killed in the ensuing violence. The present calamity is man-made, unlike the earthquake five months ago. The violence this time is because of a disregard for the interests of the Janajati and Madhesi peoples of Nepal, consisting of several disadvantaged and subaltern social groups, including the Tharus, who are amongst its most marginalised communities.

These groups believe the promise of a democratic restructuring of the state stands subverted. The six-State federation model initially put on the table in early August by the ruling coalition, and supported by the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [UCPN-M], as also the later version that added a Province, reflect political parsimony and gerrymandering that would effectively disenfranchise the Janajati and Madhesi communities.

Repression not the solution

Repression cannot be the right response to political disaffection. This can only increase alienation and cause irreparable long-term damage to Nepal’s national cohesion. The plan to ride out the protests by a display of force might, instead, lead to a bigger movement, as happened at the time of the Jana Andolan of 2006 and the Madhesi agitation of 2007.

The Jana Andolan unseated the monarchy. The Madhesi agitation persuaded the late Girijababu (Girija Prasad Koirala, the then Prime Minister) to guarantee a federation in Nepal, and delimit the Constituent Assembly (CA) seats in the Terai and the mid-hills, proportionate to the population. In early 2008, he enabled an eight-point agreement accepting the Madhesi people’s call for “an autonomous Madhes and other people’s desire for a federal structure with autonomous regions.”

The social and political contracts he helped create must not be cast away. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala must respect the legacy of Girijababu, at whose feet he learnt his politics, and embrace an inclusive discourse. If not, Nepal might again face troubled times, and the half-hearted republicans and closet monarchists, together with other regressive elements, might drag Nepali politics irrevocably backwards.

In pushing ahead with voting on a contested Constitution, the ruling coalition in Nepal might be on the verge of squandering the gains of their electoral victory of November 2013. Excluding the 26 nominated seats in the 601 seat Assembly, the Nepali Congress (NC) won 196 seats, followed by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [(CPN (UML)] which won 175, together constituting a comfortable majority. The victors should not fall victim to a sense of triumphalism. They won not because the Janajati and Madhesi voters rejected their own empowerment, but because the Maoist and Madhesi leaders did not deliver on their promises.

The Cabinet’s cosmetic invitation to the Tharu and Madhesi leaders for a dialogue, without the commitment to compromise, was like using the wick of a candle to light an electric bulb. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Mr. Koirala on August 25, he called for restraint, an end to violence, and restoration of social harmony. He reiterated that Nepal’s political leadership should resolve all outstanding issues through dialogue between all political parties through a process of consultation involving all the parties. This was not done.

Democracy in Nepal has had fitful progress. The overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1951, following King Tribhuvan’s dramatic evacuation to Delhi and triumphal return, did not immediately result in popular rule. The Interim Government of Nepal Act of 1951 limited the Cabinet’s authority. First King Tribhuvan, and from 1955 his son and successor, King Mahendra, continued to control the key levers of government, making the country’s politics palace-centric.

The lining up of political leaders at the Narayanhiti Palace — for attention and office — undermined their standing. Monarchy played musical chairs with the Cabinet, with 10 of them constituted and sacked in eight years, until a new Constitution was adopted in 1959. NC’s impressive victory was rewarded with a dismissal the following year, with the Prime Minister jailed, political parties outlawed, and multiparty democracy replaced by a party-less Panchayat regime that lasted 30 years.

The first large-scale people’s democratic movement in Nepal, known as Jana Andolan-I, brought down this regime. King Birendra quickly adjusted to the new contingency. A new Constitution was promulgated the following year; parliamentary elections held in 1991, 1994, and 1999; and local-level elections in 1992 and 1997. Democratic consolidation was prevented by palace-inspired intrigues, and from 1996, by the added challenge of the Maoist insurgency.

After King Birendra’s patricidal killing in 2001, his successor, King Gyanendra, dispensed with democratic accountability and concentrated executive authority in his hands. Based on the twin demands of democracy and social justice, a second wave of the people’s movement erupted in April 2006 that swept out the monarchy from the Nepali political system.

The demand for an inclusive democracy was not simply superimposed on Nepal’s emerging democratic edifice as a distemper that could be dusted off — the inheritance of Jana Andolan-II and the Madhesi movement of 2006-07 embedded this idea in the very foundations of the new republic.

At the very first meeting of the CA, on May 28, 2008, all members present, excluding four from Rashtriya Prajatantrik Party-Nepal, declared Nepal to be a federal democratic republic. With their common adversary — the monarchy — gone, the clashing interests of the major parties came to fore. They expended much of their energy in the making and unmaking of governments. This caused political fragmentation, especially within UCPN-M, which split into two, and the Madhesi parties, which multiplied in four years from three major parties into thirteen. CA members were not involved in the shaping of constitutional debate. The social capital accumulated by civil society in 2006-07 was largely frittered away. Compromises and consensus-making became impossible.

Differences on the nature and form of federalism cut to the heart of Nepal’s political predicament. The first CA’s Committee of State Restructuring recommendation of 14 Provinces was considered profligate. An independent High Level State Restructuring Recommendation Commission then recommended 10 Provinces. Divergence on the number, names, boundary delineation, and division of powers between Centre and Provinces continued to hold up progress.

No return to a unitary order

Despite the marginalisation of forces favouring inclusive federalism in the 2013 elections, attempts to revert to what journalist C.K. Lal describes as “the old unitary and exclusionary order” will not be politically sustainable in the long run. The lesson from the present agitation is that unless the new Constitution is equitable, and encapsulates the values emanating from the womb of the people’s movements, Nepal’s quest for democratic governance might again run aground.

First and foremost, the Nepal Army, a force of the last resort, must be pulled out from the Terai districts. Nepal’s Human Rights Commission has asked government to do so, while urging the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) to keep their agitation peaceful. In a stunning indictment of the police, the Commission noted that protesters who died or were injured had been shot in the head, chest and stomach, proving the “excessive use of force,” and violation of humanitarian norms.

The triumvirate with a combined majority in CA that can ramrod the draft Constitution through — the NC, the CPN (UML), and the UCPN-M — must eschew the temptation to promulgate a Constitution that is widely unacceptable.

Between the completion of the clause-by-clause voting and the adoption of the Constitution as a whole, they must revisit the process and seek the broadest measure of consensus. For a Constitution that has taken over seven years to negotiate, imposing an artificial deadline is incomprehensible.

The oldest and the newest Constitutions in South Asia, those of India and Bhutan, had the signatures of each and every member of their Constituent Assembly and the National Assembly, respectively. It will be a pity for Nepal to promulgate a Constitution that does not bear the signatures of all or nearly all of its CA members.

The differences affect just five of the 75 districts of Nepal, which is already assured of a federation. The effort now should be to reduce the remaining differences on the number and boundaries of the States to the barest minimum and remit the remaining issues to a commission.

Nepalis have a proven capacity for eschewing brinkmanship and showing flexibility. They have faced situations more difficult than the one that confronts Nepal today. They helped their country move from a state of insurgency and civil war to the quest for an inclusive democratic order. Visionary leadership can again overcome the clash of interests between the ruling Bahun-Chhetri elite and the Janajatis, Dalits and Madhesis. It is time for Nepal’s political leaders to show this can be done. The quest for a new Constitution has reached the last lap of a long marathon. This is not the time to stumble and fall.

(Jayant Prasad is a former Indian Ambassador to Nepal. Currently, he is advisor, Delhi Policy Group and visiting fellow at the Research and Information System for Developing Countries.)

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/federalism-nepals-final-frontier/article7652362.ece